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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
-oooOooo-

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 990275-CA

vs.
GREG TUCKER,
Defendant and Appellant.

Priority No. 2
This is an appeal of the trial court's failure to sustain the defendant's
objection regarding the state's failure to produce discoverable information and
adequately respond to the defendant's Request for Bill of Particulars. In this matter,
the defendant submitted a Request for Discovery and a Request for Bill of Particulars.
It was not until the day of trial was the defendant apprized of the prosecution's theory
that the defendant violated an Ex Parte Protective Order, rather than a Protective Order
as alleged in the information. Such failures unfairly prejudiced the defendant at trial as
the defendant did not have adequate opportunity to prepare a defense against a claimed

violation of the Ex Parte Protective Order. Mr. Oliver, attorney for defendant, knew
that the time-line did not match regarding the protective order. The alleged incident
occurred on September 2, 1998. The defendant had not been served with the Protective
Order until after that date. Thus, no violation of the Protective Order, or law,
occurred-that was the defense's theory going into trial the morning of January 22,
1999. When the issue of the State's failure was raised, the court ruled that the Ex
Parte Protective Order is a Protective Order. However true that may be, without
concession, the problem still remained as the prosecution failed to clearly disclose it's
theory of the case timely. Within the Cohabitant Abuse Act, the Act defines the
meanings of both Protective Order and Ex Parte Protective Order and it was reasonable
for the defense to believe that the State intended to show a violation of the Protective
Order and not of the ex parte order. This is especially true when Section 76-5-108
specifically names both orders allowing for a violation of either.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3
(1953, as amended) (2)(e) (appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except
those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony). The appellant appeals
the final order and judgment of the Seventh Judicial District Court, in and for Grand
County involving his conviction of a Violation of a Protective Order, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (1953, as amended).

2

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the defendant had been denied due process of law by the State's

failure to provide him with adequate notice of the State's intended case.
2.

Whether an Ex Parte Protective Order is a Protective Order, within the

intended meaning which would remove the State of the obligation to provide the
defendant with adequate notice in order to prepare his defense.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
(l)-(2). The defendant was denied due process of law and he was not
afforded adequate notice in order to prepare a defense. The State's Information filed in
this matter was defective, and the State failed to respond to the defense's timely filed
Request for Bill of Particulars.
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. Ward v. Richfield City, 798
P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). Utah appellate courts review questions of law under
a correction of error standard, without deference to the trial court. Bellon v.
Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991); Ward, 798 P.2d at 759.
State v. Bagshaw, 836 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Because the application of a statute is a question of law, the appellate court must review
for correctness the actions of the trial court. See State v. Grate, 947 P.2d 1161, 1164
(Utah Ct. App. 1997).

STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
[Included herewith in Addendum A.]
3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case:
This case arises from an appeal of the final judgment of the Seventh

District Court. On September 18, 1998, the State filed an Information against Mr.
Tucker claiming a violation of "a protective order issued by this Court after having
been properly served with it." (R. at 1). This charge was never amended. The defense
knew that the State would be unable to prove timely service (and knowledge) because
the Protective Order had not been served upon the defendant at the time of the incident.
The order had only been entered on September 2, 1998. (See Addendum B).
Meanwhile, in response to the defense's request for discovery and request for a bill of
particulars, the prosecution only provided the defense a copy of the information
claiming a violation of the "protective order" and failed to attempt any supplementation
or revision.
On the day of trial, January 22, 1999, the defense presented the trial court
with Mr. Tucker's Motion to Dismiss. (R. at 52-62, Addendum C). In the defense's
motion, the defense claims numerous technical errors regarding the protective order.
The motion should have been dispositive of the issues suspect for trial. But for the
judge's avoidance of the issue by substituting the protective order with the ex parte,
trial would not have occurred. The judge's decision relieved the State of its legal
obligations abridging Mr. Tucker's constitutional rights which resulted in substantial
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prejudice. This appeal followed.
II.

Course of the Proceedings:
On September 18, 1998, The State filed it's Information against Mr.

Tucker claiming a violation of the September 2, 1998 protective order. (R. at 1). The
alleged incident occurred on that same date, September 2nd. Mr. Oliver was retained
and he entered his appearance on October 5, 1998. (R. at 5-14). This appearance was
accompanied by a Request for Discovery as well as a Request for Bill of Particulars.
(Supra.) The State's response to the request for a bill of particulars merely referenced
to the State Information filed against Mr. Tucker.
Believing the State's Information to be accurate depiction of the State's
case, Mr. Tucker prepared a defense against the alleged Protective Order. Trial was
subsequently held on January 22, 1999 after the trial judge ruled that the State could
proceed with trial on the claims for violating the ex parte order. This trial day
substitution prejudiced the defense at trial because the defense's exhibits were
Protective Order related not Ex Parte Protective Order related. After the denial of the
defense's motion to dismiss, the jury returned to the courtroom and the State presented
it's case.
///.

Disposition in Trial Court:
The trial jury returned a verdict of guilty.

IV.

Statement of Facts:
See part II above.1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Under Section 76-5-108, Mr. Tucker was convicted of violating an Ex
Parte Protective Order, a Class A Misdemeanor. However, this theory was not the
purported case for the State up till the day of trial. The State's theory apparently
changed upon notice, or receipt of the faxed copy of the defense's motion to dismiss.
Nevertheless, at the trial, the court allowed the State to proceed with trial on the
premise that Mr. Tucker violated the Ex Parte Protective Order. At no time prior to
this date did the defense suspect that the State's case could change the day of trial.
Discovery and requests for Bills of Particular were submitted and are designed to avoid
this type of surprise during trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY DEPRIVED OF DUE
PROCESS BY DIRECTLY VIOLATING THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSES OF
THE CONSTITUTIONS.
Mr. Tucker has certain rights as an accused person. Under the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution,

1

The course of the proceedings is the nature of this appeal.
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an accused person enjoys certain inalienable rights, including among other things, the
right to be confronted with his charges prior to trial so as to benefit him with the
opportunity to prepare an adequate defense.
(1) Constitutional Provisions.
The Utah State Constitution provides, in pertinent part:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself;
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Utah Const, art. I, § 12. Moreover, the Constitution states:
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be
prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a
magistrate, unless the examination be waived by the accused with the
consent of the State, or by indictment, with or without such examination
and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and
duties thereof shall be prescribed by the Legislature.
Utah Const, art. I, § 13.
The U.S. Constitution provides the same protections, under the Fifth, Sixth,
and Fourteenth Amendments.
These redundant and overlapping constitutional protections are best
explained in the Utah Constitution Article I, Section 26 and 27, which provides:
7

The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by
expressed words they are declared to be otherwise.
Utah Const, art. I, § 26.
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of
individual rights and the perpetuity of free government.
Utah Const, art. I, § 27.
(2) Statutory Provisions.
Section 77-14-1 provides:
The prosecuting attorney, on timely written demand of the defendant, shall within
ten days, or such other time as the court may allow, specify in writing as
particularly as is known to him the place, date and time of the commission of the
offense charged.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-1 (1997).
(3) Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by indictment or
information sworn to by a person having reason to believe the offense has been
committed.
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the defendant
is being prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by common law or by
statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to give
the defendant notice of the charge. An information may contain or be
accompanied by a statement of facts sufficient to make out probable cause to
sustain the offense charged where appropriate. Such things as time, place,
means, intent, manner, value and ownership need not be alleged unless
necessary to charge the offense. Such things as money, securities, written
instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments may be described by any name or
description by which they are generally known or by which they may be identified
without setting forth a copy. However, details concerning such things may be
8

obtained through a bill of particulars. Neither presumptions of law nor matters
of judicial notice need be stated.
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language from an indictment or
information.
(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at any time
before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the substantial
rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or
information may be amended so as to state the offense with such particularity as to
bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon the same set of facts.
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to inform a
defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to enable him to
prepare his defense, the defendant may file a written motion for a bill of
particulars. The motion shall be filed at arraignment or within ten days thereafter,
or at such later time as the court may permit. The court may, on its own motion,
direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A bill of particulars may be amended or
supplemented at any time subject to such conditions as justice may require. The
request for and contents of a bill of particulars shall be limited to a statement of
factual information needed to set forth the essential elements of the particular
offense charged.
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because any name
contained therein may be incorrectly spelled or stated.
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception, excuse or proviso contained
in the statute creating or defining the offense.
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual meaning
unless they are otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal meaning,
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive shall not invalidate the
indictment or information.
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or information was
based shall be endorsed thereon before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall not
affect the validity but endorsement shall be ordered by the court on application of
the defendant. Upon request the prosecuting attorney shall, except upon a showing
of good cause, furnish the names of other witnesses he proposes to call whose
names are not so endorsed.
9

(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to appear
before the magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or counsel. Proceedings
against a corporation shall be the same as against a natural person.
Id. (Emphasis added).

B. Mr. Tucker was Deprived of Due Process as a Result of the State's Trial Day
Change in the Theory of the State's Case-Defective Notice.
In this matter, the prosecution failed to disclose it's intended case alleging a
violation of the Ex Parte Protective Order. The State seemed insistent that it claimed a
violation of the "Protective Order". (R. at 1). The defense believes that the prosecution
changed it's theory on the case only as a result of receiving a copy of the defense's
motion to dismiss. Unfortunately, the change in the theory did not come out until the day
of trial. The trial judge allowed trial to proceed on the premise that Mr. Tucker violated
the Ex Parte Protective Order entered by the court on July 30, 1998, rather than the
Protective Order entered by the court on September 2, 1998.
Rule 4, supra., states when a defendant may file for a Bill of Particulars. In
the case at hand, the defense did timely render such a request. In response, the plaintiff
reasserted it's case to be that Mr. Tucker violation the Protective Order as set forth in the
State's Information. The purpose of a request for a bill of particulars is to avoid the very
problem, the surprise which occurred in this trial.
The issue of bills of particulars was addressed very clearly by the Utah
Supreme Court in State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028 (1991). The Court's opinion reads:
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We first consider the state constitutional provisions that grant a defendant a right
to adequate notice of the charged offense. The right to adequate notice may be
based on the general due process clause in article I, section 7 of the Utah
Constitution. Utah Const, art. I, § 7. It may also be based on the more specific
guarantee in article I, section 12, which states that "the accused shall have the
right... to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, [and] to
have a copy thereof." Utah Const, art. I, § 12. With regard to the issues presented
here, this court has held that the analysis under the due process clause is not
different from that required by article I, section 12. State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208,
1214 (Utah 1987), cert, denied. 484 U.S. 1044, 108 S. Ct. 777, 98 L. Ed. 2d 864
(1988). Essentially, the constitutional question is whether "a criminal defendant
[is] sufficiently apprised of the particulars of the charge to be able to 'adequately
prepare his defense.'" Id (quoting State v. Burnett. 712 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah
1985)).
In determining whether a defendant has been denied this right, we follow a rather
elaborate analysis that focuses on Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 4(e) and
section 77-14-1 of the Code, the provisions that implement the constitutional
guarantee. See Utah R. Crim. P. 4(e); Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-1 (1990). Only
after we have found that a defendant has not waived the rights the statute and rule
provide do we decide whether the notice given was adequate. See Fulton, 742
P.2datl215.
As Fulton explained, the notice to which a defendant is constitutionally entitled
may come through one or all of three sources: the charging information, a
response to a bill of particulars under rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, or a response, under section 77-14-1 of the Code, to a demand for the
place, date, and time of the offense charged. See Fulton, 742 P.2d at 1214. Utah
law provides that a defendant who so requests is entitled as a matter of right to
both a bill of particulars and a specification of the date, place, and time of the
charged crime. IcL; State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985); see also
State v. Solomon, 93 Utah 70, 75, 71 P.2d 104, 106 (1937). However, if a
defendant fails to request a bill of particulars or make demand for the date, place,
and time under section 77-14-1 and a response to either of
these would have cured the claimed deficiency, then he or she will be deemed to
have waived the constitutional right to adequate notice. Fulton, 742 P.2d at 1215.
If the defendant has not waived the right to more specific information and the
State has responded with the best information it has, or if the defendant has not
requested additional information but the information if requested would not have
li

given further notice, then we proceed to determine whether the notice supplied to
the defendant is constitutionally adequate. IcL The right to adequate notice in the
Utah Constitution requires the prosecution to state the charge with sufficient
specificity to protect the defendant from multiple prosecutions for the same crime
and to give notice sufficient for the one charged to prepare a defense. Icl at 1214;
State v. Strand. 720 P.2d 425, 427 (Utah 1986); State v. Bundv. 684 P.2d 58, 62
(Utah 1984); State v. Myers. 5 Utah 2d 365, 371, 302 P.2d 276, 279 (1956).
Because of the almost infinite variety of circumstances where the question may
arise, there are few ironclad rules for determining the adequacy of notice beyond
the requirement that the elements of the offense be alleged. See Utah R. Crim. P.
4(a). In the area of variance between the allegations and the proof at trial, we
have some helpful precedent. See, e.g., State v. Marcum. 750 P.2d 599, 601-02
(Utah 1988); Strand. 720 P.2d at 428; State v. Burnett. 712 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah
1985); McNair v. Havward. 666 P.2d 321, 326 (Utah 1983); Utah R. Crim. P.
30(a). But outside that area, a challenge to the constitutional adequacy of notice
inevitably draws us into a generalized weighing of the completeness of the notice
and its adequacy for the defendant's purposes against the background of the
information legitimately available to the prosecuting authority.
Id. In the case at hand, Mr. Tucker had not been adequately provided notice, thus
violating the due process protections guaranteed to him. He did not waive his right to
more specific information, rather he exercised that right. Utah law provides that a
defendant who so requests a bill of particulars is entitled as a matter of right to both a bill
of particulars and a specification of the date, place, and time of the charged. Mr. Tucker,
in this case, made his request for more specific information on or about October 5, 1998,
just a little more than two weeks from the filing date of the information.
In addition to being entitled to dates, places, and times, the nature and
cause of the offense the prosecution must be disclose additional specific information
upon the request by the defendant. This information includes information relating to
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means, intent, manner, and other related factual evidence necessary to charge the
offense. Moreover, the State must describe such things^s written instruments, pictures,
statutes and judgments may be described by any name or-description by which they are
generally known, this would include the correct order allegedly violated. However, in
violation of the Utah State Constitution, Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-1, and Rule 4 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the prosecution merely responded with a reference to
thefiledInformation. This the response the State provided was insufficient, thus
violating Mr. Tucker's right to due process.
At the trial, when the defense raised this issue was addressed by the
defense, the trial judge responded with, "Denied. When you wait until two days before
the trial to indicate what you think his theory is, I don't think Mr. Benge has to
immediately call you and tell you that he thinks you're mistaken about that, and an ex
parte protective order is a protective order. The Court will be in recess." (R. at 15 pg.
8).2
The trial court may be right, an ex parte protective order is a protective
order. However, there are distinctions. The Legislature specifically defined them
separately so that the Legislature could provide an accused person with notice that he
may be charged with violating either a protective order or an ex parte protective order.

2

The clerk of the trial court did not individually paginate the trial transcript, only
the cover was marked as 115 of the record. Therefore, pages referred to in the transcript
will be cited as the Record followed by "@" and the page number of the transcript itself.
13

In section 30-6-1(7) of the Utah Code, "'Ex parte protective order' means an order
issued without notice to the defendant in accordance with this chapter." In section 306-1(11) of the Utah Code, "'Protective order' means a restraining order issued pursuant
to this chapter subsequent to a hearing on the petition, of which the petitioner has given
notice in accordance with this chapter."
Meanwhile, in the criminal code, section 76-5-108 criminalizes violations
of either protective orders or ex parte protective orders. In particular, the statute
provides:
(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject to a protective order
or ex parte protective order issued under Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse
Act, or Title 78, Chapter 3a, Juvenile Court Act of 1996, Title 77, Chapter 36,
Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act, or a foreign protective order as described in
Section 30-6-12, who intentionally or knowingly violates that order after having
been properly served, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, except as a greater
penalty may be provided in Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures
Act.
(2) Violation of an order as described in Subsection (1) is a domestic violence
offense under Section 77-36-1 and subject to increased penalties in accordance
with Section 77-36-1.1.
Id.

In light of the language of section 76-5-108, the prosecution is required to clarify

it's intentions by disclosing it's theory on the case upon the request of the defendant.
It's not unreasonable for the State to identify whether it intends to prosecute the
defendant for a knowing violation of the ex parte protective order or of the protective
order.
As a result of the State's errant disclosure to the defense, the defense
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D. Bruce Oliver #5120
Attorney for Defendant
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490
Telephone: (801) 328-8888
Fax: (801) 595-0300

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County, Utah
FILED

JAN 2 2

1999

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo

STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
vs.
GREG TUCKER,

Case no. 9817-163
Defendant.

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Comes now the defendant, Greg Tucker, by and through counsel, D. Bruce
Oliver, and hereby submits this memorandum of points and authorities.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are based on the statements made within the Information,
the police reports and supplemental reports prepared by the officers involved which have been
provided to the defendant, and any logical inferences drawn therefrom. These facts are
provided for the purpose of demonstrating a legal theory and Mr. Tucker does not concede to
these facts or this factual scenario nor does he admit any guilt expressed or implied.
1.

The defendant and the alleged victim, Rachel Tucker, are husband and wife

having been married for some time now.

2.

During the course of the marriage, the two have conceived and raised two

minor children, to wit: Brittney Tucker, a female, born January 6, 1992; Trevor Tucker, a
male, born August 18, 1993; and Tyler Tucker, a male, boy August 18, 1993.
3.

In addition, the defendant has two stepchildren born to the victim from prior to

their relationship, to wit: Marcy Jarrett, a female, born April 15, 1986; and Colt Jarrett, a
male, born May 21, 1987.
4.

For the most of this relationship, the parties have been without substantial

incident and a strong bond has been enjoyed by the parties and their children alike.
5.

At some point, the parties got into a fight and the defendant had been removed

from the marital residence by an Ex Parte Protective Order.
6.

Then on August 19, 1998 at the hour of 3:30 p.m. the Seventh District Court

conducted a Protective Order hearing wherein the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson granted a
Protective Order.
7.

Said Protective was prepared by the Utah Legal Services, Inc. which is

defective on it's face.
8.

The defendant has been subsequently charged with violating said Protective

Order
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE PROTECTIVE ORDER IS UNENFORCEABLE FOR CRIMINAL
SANCTIONS AS IT IS VOID AND DEFECTIVE ON ITS FACE.
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-6-4 outlines the form and content of a lawful
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Protective Order. This Section reads:
(1) (a) The offices of the court clerk shall provide forms and nonlegal assistance to
persons seeking to proceed under this chapter.
(b) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall develop and adopt uniform forms
for petitions and orders for protection in accordance with the provisions of this chapter
on or before September 1, 1995. That office shall provide the forms to the clerk of
each court authorized to issue protective orders. The forms shall include:
(i) a statement notifying the petitioner for an ex parte protective order that
knowing falsification of any statement or information provided for the purpose of
obtaining a protective order may subject the petitioner to felony prosecution;
(ii) a separate portion of the form for those provisions, the violation of which is a
criminal offense, and a separate portion for those provisions, the violation of which is a
civil violation, as provided in Subsection 30-6-4.2(5);
(iii) language in the criminal provision portion stating violation of any criminal
provision is a class A misdemeanor, and language in the civil portion stating violation
of or failure to comply with a civil provision is subject to contempt proceedings;
(iv) a space for information the petitioner is able to provide to facilitate
identification of the respondent, such as social security number, driver license number,
date of birth, address, telephone number, and physical description;
(v) a space for the petitioner to request a specific period of time for the civil
provisions to be in effect, not to exceed 150 days, unless the petitioner provides in
writing the reason for the requested extension of the length of time beyond 150 days;
(vi) a statement advising the petitioner that when a minor child is included in an
ex parte protective order or a protective order, as part of either the criminal or the civil
portion of the order, the petitioner may provide a copy of the order to the principal of
the school where the child attends; and
(vii) a statement advising the petitioner that if the respondent fails to return
custody of a minor child to the petitioner as ordered in a protective order, the petitioner
may obtain from the court a writ of assistance.
(2) If the person seeking to proceed under this chapter is not represented by an
attorney, it is the responsibility of the court clerk's office to provide:
(a) the forms adopted pursuant to Subsection (1);
(b) all other forms required to petition for an order for protection including, but
not limited to, forms for service;
(c) clerical assistance in filling out the forms and filing the petition, in accordance
with Subsection (l)(a). A court clerk's office may designate any other entity, agency,
or person to provide that service, but the court clerk's office is responsible to see that
the service is provided;
(d) information regarding the means available for the service of process;
(e) a list of legal service organizations that may represent the petitioner in an action
brought under this chapter, together with the telephone numbers of those organizations;
and
(f) written information regarding the procedure for transporting a jailed or
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imprisoned respondent to the protective order hearing, including an explanation of the
use of transportation order forms when necessary.
(3) No charges may be imposed by a court clerk, constable, or law enforcement
agency for:
(a) filing a petition under this chapter;
(b) obtaining an ex parte protective order;
(c) obtaining copies, either certified or not certified, necessary for service or
delivery to law enforcement officials; or
(d) fees for service of a petition, ex parte protective order, or protective order.
(4) A petition for an order of protection shall be in writing and verified.
(5) (a) All orders for protection shall be issued in the form adopted by the
Administrative Office of the Courts pursuant to Subsection (1).
(b) Each protective order issued, except orders issued ex parte, shall include the
following language:
"Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity to be heard in the hearing
that gave rise to this order. Pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, P.L.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 18 U.S.C.A. 2265, this order is valid in all the United States,
the District of Columbia, tribal lands, and United States territories."
Id. In this matter, the Protective Order that has been allegedly violated is unlawful as it does
not comport with Section 30-6-4 in many respects.
A.
The Protective Order is Not on the Form Uniformly Adopted by the
Administrative Office of the Courts.
Subsection (1) provides that the offices of the court clerk shall provide the
necessary forms and nonlegal assistance to persons seeking to proceed under this chapter.
These forms have been specifically developed and adopted by the Administrative Office of the
Courts and distributed throughout the State of Utah to be uniformly provides and used by
persons seeking Protective Orders while still providing Constitutional protection to the
respondents or defendants of said Protective Orders. In ihis matter, the Protective order
prepared by Utah Legal Services, Inc. violated Subsection (1) because it was not prepared in
the Administrative Office of the Courts' form.
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B.
The Protective Order Inappropriately Criminalizes Would Be Civil
Provisions of the Uniform Forms.
On the approved forms there are numbered paragraphs and alphabetical
paragraphs. The number paragraphs are provisions if violated warrant criminal offenses. The
alphabetical paragraphs are provisions if violated do not warrant criminal offenses. The
numbered paragraphs provide the following:
1.
The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or
threatening to commit abuse or domestic violence against Petitioner.
2.
The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or
threatening to commit abuse or domestic violence against the following minor children
and members of Petitioner's family or household:

3.
The Respondent is prohibited from directly or indirectly contacting,
harassing, telephoning, or otherwise communicating with the Petitioner.
4.
The Respondent shall be removed and excluded, and shall stay away,
from Petitioner's residence, and its premises, located at:
and Respondent is prohibited from terminating or interfering with
the utility services to the residence.
5.
The Respondent is ordered to stay away from the school, place of
employment, and/or other places, and their premises, frequented by Petitioner, the
minor children and the designated household and family members. These places are
identified by the following addresses:
6.
The Court having found that Respondent's use or possession of a weapon
may pose a serious threat of harm to Petitioner, the Respondent is prohibited from
purchasing, using, or possessing a firearm and/or the following weapon(s):
7.
The Petitioner is awarded possession of the following residence,
automobile and/or other essential personal effects:
This award is subject to orders concerning the listed property in future domestic
proceedings.
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8.

An officer from the following law enforcement agency:
shall accompany Petitioner to ensure that Petitioner
safely regains possession of the awarded property.
9.
An office from the same law enforcement agency shall facilitate
Respondent's removal of Respondent's essential personal belongings from the parties'
residence. The law enforcement officer shall contact Petitioner to make these
arrangements. Respondent may not contact the Petitioner or enter the residence to
obtain any items.
10.
The Respondent is placed under the supervision of the Department of
Corrections for the purposes of electronic monitoring. Within 24 hours of the
execution of this Order. The Department of Corrections shall place an electronic
monitoring device on Respondent and shall install monitoring equipment on the
premises of Petitioner and it the residence of Respondent. Respondent is ordered to
pay the Department of Corrections the costs of the electronic monitoring required by
this Order. The Department of Corrections shall have access to Petitioner's residence
to install the appropriate monitoring equipment.
In this matter, the prepared Protective Order exceeds the scope of these exclusive provisions.
This order in this matter also criminalizes civil provisions that are designed to expire in 150
days. The defendant cannot be charged with a criminal offense for custody or visitation
issues. Criminal offenses can only be charged for intentionally committing abuse or domestic
violence. In this matter, no domestic violence or abuse are alleged to have been intentionally
committed.
C.
The Protective Order Does Not Provide Mandatory Language in the
Protective Order.
The Protective Order is required to include some very important and specific
statements. The order is required to include a statement advising the petitioner that when a
minor child is included in an ex parte protective order or a protective order, as part of either
the criminal or the civil portion of the order, the petitioner may provide a copy of the order to
the principal of the school where the child attends. The order is required to include a
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statement advising that a violation of any criminal provision is a class A misdemeanor, and
language in the civil portion stating violation of or failure to comply with a civil provision is
subject to contempt proceedings. The order is required to include a statement advising the
petitioner that if the respondent fails to return custody of a minor child to the petitioner as
ordered in a protective order, the petitioner may obtain from the court a writ of assistance.
The order is required to include the specific language:
Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity to be heard in the hearing that
gave rise to this order. Pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, P.L.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 18 U.S.C.A. 2265, this order is valid in all the United States,
the District of Columbia, tribal lands, and United States territories.
Id. Except for the Class A Misdemeanor provision, none of these provisions are included in
the order. And as for the Class A Misdemeanor provision it is combined the civil provision
and wrongfully criminalizes non-criminal behavior. These failures and omissions cause the
Protective Order to be void as it is defective on it's face.
D.

The Protective Order Requires the Judge to Initial Each Provision.
The form approved by the Administrative Office of the Courts require the judge

to initial each and every provision it intended to have in effect against the respondent or
defendant. In this matter, the Protective Order judge has not initialed each of the provisions
on the Protective Order. This failure and omission causes the Protective Order to be void as it
is defective on it's face.
E.
This Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Proceed on the Criminal Offense in
Light of the Void and Defective Order.
The defendant has not violated Section 76-5-108. This Section provides:
(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject to a protective order or ex
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parte protective order issued under Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse Act, or Title
78, Chapter 3a, Juvenile Courts, Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures
Act, or a foreign protective order as described in Section 30-6-12, who intentionally
violates that order after having been properly served, is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, except as a greater penalty may be provided in Title 77, Chapter 36,
Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act.
Id. In this matter, the defendant has not violated a Protective Order as provided under Title
30, Chapter 6 or Title 77, Chapter 36 in light of the violation of Section 30-6-4 as explained
hereinabove. As a result of said violation, this Court lacks jurisdiction to proceed against the
defendant. The defendant has not violated a Title 30, Chapter 6 Protective Order.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, the defendant hereby respectfully requests
this Honorable Court to dismiss this matter. The Protective Order alleged to have been
violated by the defendant is void and defective on its face.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of
January, 1999.

c^Z^^L^/
D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendant

8

CERTIFICATE OF FAXING/MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be transmitted a telefacsimile to (435) 259-3926
and I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS, postage prepaid, to: William
L. Benge, Grand County Attorney, 125 East Center, Moab, Utah 84532.
Dated this 20th day of January, 1999.
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reference.
In this matter, the defendant is likely to prevail on the merits of this case and
said motion is in no way adverse to the public interest.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of
January, 1999.
D. BRUCE OLIVER
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF FAXING/MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be transmitted a telefacsimile to (435) 259-3926
and I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS, postage
prepaid, to: William L. Benge, Grand County Attorney, 125 East Center, Moab, Utah 84532.
Dated this 20th day of January, 1999.
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believed the State was claiming Mr. Tucker violated the Protective Order, so the
defense prepared it's case against the Protective Order, alone. This belief is selfevident by the issues raised in the defense's motion to dismiss. The defense's motion
should have disposed of the case. Instead, the trial court saved the State's case at the
expense of Mr. Tucker's constitutional rights. The State should have been held
accountable for it's error; the trial court should have granted the defense's motion to
dismiss. Obviously, this would mean the State could have refiled claiming a violation
of the ex parte order, however, the defense believes even (hat claim was defensible on
the merits.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Tucker has been unjustly treated in this matter. The trial court
should not have denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. The State had 126 days to
provide the defendant notice of the State's intended theory that Mr. Tucker violated the
ex parte protective order. The day-of-trial disclosure ofihe State's actual allegation
appears to be out of convenience, due to the defense's notice to the prosecution of the
motion to dismiss. As a result, Mr. Tucker was deprived of due process and he was
prevented an adequate opportunity to prepare a defense to the State's allegations.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of
March, 2000.
T

r^
D. BRUCE OLIVER
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 27th day of March, 2000,
I served a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon the counsel for the
Appellee in this matter, by mailing it to the State of Utah by first class mail with
sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: William L. Benge, Grand County
Attorney, 125 East Center Street, Moab, Utah 84532.
Dated this 27th day of March, 2000.

D. BRUCE OLIVER
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ADDENDUM A

Section
26 [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory ]
27 [Fundamental rights ]
28 [Declaration of the rights of crime victims ]

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
PREAMBLE
Article
I
Declaration of Rights
II
State Boundaries
III
Ordinance
IV Elections and Right of Suffrage
V Distribution of Powers
VI
Legislative Department
VII
Executive Department
VIII
Judicial Department
IX
Congressional and Legislative Apportionment
X
Education
XI
Counties, Cities and Towns
XI
Local Governments [Proposed]
XII
Corporations
XIII
Revenue and Taxation
XIV Public Debt
XV
Militia
XVI
Labor
XVII
Water Rights
XVIII
Forestry
XIX
Public Buildings and State Institutions
XX
Public Lands
XXI
Salaries
XXII
Miscellaneous
XXIII
Amendment and Revision
XXIV
Schedule

Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and
defend their lives and liberties, to acquire, possess and protect
property, to worship according to the dictates of their consciences, to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and
petition for redress of grievances, to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of t h a t
right

1896

Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the people.]
All political power is inherent in the people, and all free
governments are founded on their authority for their equal
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or
reform their government as the public welfare may require
1896

Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.]
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the Federal
Union and the Constitution of the United States is t h e
supreme law of the land
1896
Sec. 4.

PREAMBLE
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, the people
of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate the principles of
free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION
1896
ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Section
1 [Inherent and inalienable rights ]
2 [All political power inherent in the people ]
3 [Utah inseparable from the Union ]
[Religious liberty ] [Proposed ]
5 [Habeas corpus ]
6 [Right to bear arms ]
7 [Due process of law ]
8 [Offenses bailable ]
9 [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments ]
10 [Trial by jury]
11 [Courts open — Redress of injuries ]
12 [Rights of accused persons ]
13 [Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury ]
14 [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant ]
15 [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel ]
16 [No imprisonment for debt — Exception ]
17 [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting ]
18 [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts ]
19 [Treason denned — Proof ]
20 [Military subordinate to the civil power ]
21 [Slavery forbidden ]
22 [Private property for public use ]
23 [Irrevocable franchises forbidden ]
24 [Uniform operation of laws ]
25 [Rights retained by people ]

[Religious liberty — N o property qualification
to v o t e or h o l d office.]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed The State
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, no religious test shall be
required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for
any vote at any election, nor shall any person be incompetent
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or t h e
absence thereof There shall be no union of Church and State,
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its
functions No public money or property shall be appropriated
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction,
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment No
property qualification shall be required of any person to vote,
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution
1896
[Religious liberty.] [Proposed.]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed The State
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, no religious test shall be
required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for
any vote at any election, nor shall any person be incompetent
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the
absence thereof There shall be no union of Church and State,
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its
functions No public money or property shall be appropriated
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction,
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment
[1999]

Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.]
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety requires it
1896

Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the
state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be
infringed, but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature
from defining the lawful use of arms
1984 (2nd S.S.)
Sec. 7. [Due p r o c e s s of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law
1896
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Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.1
(1) All persons charged with a cnme shall be bailable
except
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there is
substantial evidence to support the charge, or
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or
parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous
felony charge, when there is substantial evidence to
support the new felony charge, or
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated
by statute as one for which bail may be denied, if there is
substantial evidence to support the charge and t h e court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that t h e person
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of
the court if released on bail
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal
only as prescribed by law
1988 (2nd s s )

Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment —
Grand jury.]
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indict
ment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by
indictment, with or without such examination and commitment The formation of the grand jury and the powers and
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature 1947

Sec. 9.

Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of
speech or of the press In all criminal prosecutions for libel the
truth may be given m evidence to the jury, and if it shall
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true,
and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends,
the party shall be acquitted, and the jury shall have the right
to determine the law and the fact
1896

[Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]
Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines shall not
be imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated
with unnecessary rigor
1896
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate In capital cases t h e jury shall consist of twelve
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of
no fewer t h a n eight persons In other cases, the Legislature
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event
shall a jury consist of fewer t h a n four persons In criminal
cases t h e verdict shall be unanimous In civil cases threefourths of the jurors may find a verdict A jury in civil cases
shall be waived unless demanded.
1996
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay, and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is
a party
1896
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district m which the offense is alleged to have been committed,
and t h e right to appeal m all cases In no instance shall any
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure t h e rights herein guaranteed
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself, a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary
examination, the function of t h a t examination is limited to
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by statute Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute
or rule m whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or a t any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule
1994

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no w a n ant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to
be seized
1896

Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of
absconding debtors
1896
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military,
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the
right of suffrage Soldiers, in time of war, may vote a t their
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be
prescribed by law
1896
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing
contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing t h e
obligation of contracts shall be passed
1896
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or m giving them aid
and comfort No person shall be convicted of treason unless on
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act
1896
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.]
The military shall be in strict subordination to t h e civil
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in
any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war
except in a manner to be prescribed by law
1896
Sec. 2 1 . [Slavery forbidden.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within this State
1896
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation
1896
Sec. 2 3 . [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise,
privilege or immunity
1896
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation
1896
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ARTICLE III

Sec. 25. [Rights r e t a i n e d by people.]
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair
or deny others retained by the people.
1896
Sec. 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.]
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be
otherwise.
1896
Sec. 27. [ F u n d a m e n t a l rights.]
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential
to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity of free
government.
1896
Sec. 28. [Declaration of t h e rights of crime victims.]
(1) To preserve and protect victims' rights to justice and due
process, victims of crimes have these rights, as defined by law:
(a) To be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity,
and to be free from harassment and abuse throughout the
criminal justice process;
(b) Upon request, to be informed of, be present at, and
to be heard at important criminal justice hearings related
to the victim, either in person or through a lawful representative, once a criminal information or indictment
charging a crime has been publicly filed in court; and
(c) To have a sentencing judge, for the purpose of
imposing an appropriate sentence, receive and consider,
without evidentiary limitation, reliable information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a
person convicted of an offense except that this subsection
does not apply to capital cases or situations involving
privileges.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as creating a
cause of action for money damages, costs, or attorney's fees, or
for dismissing any criminal charge, or relief from any criminal
judgment.
(3) The provisions of this section shall extend to all felony
crimes and such other crimes or acts, including juvenile
offenses, as the Legislature may provide.
(4) The Legislature shall have the power to enforce and
define this section by statute.
1994
ARTICLE II
STATE BOUNDARIES
Section
1. [State boundaries.]
S e c t i o n 1. [State boundaries.]
The boundaries of the State of Utah shall be as follows:
Beginning at a point formed by the intersection of the
thirty-second degree of longitude west from Washington, with
the thirty-seventh degree of north latitude; thence due west
along said thirty-seventh degree of north latitude to the
intersection of the same with the thirty-seventh degree of
longitude west from Washington; thence due north along said
thirty-seventh degree of west longitude to the intersection of
the same with the forty-second degree of north latitude;
thence due east along said forty-second degree of north latitude to the intersection of the same with the thirty-fourth
degree of longitude west from Washington; thence due south
along said thirty-fourth degree of west longitude to the intersection of the same with the forty-first degree of north latitude; thence due east along said forty-first degree of north
latitude to the intersection of the same with the thirty-second
degree of longitude west from Washington; thence due south
along said thirty-second degree of west longitude to the place
of beginning
1896

Art. Ill

ORDINANCE
Section
[Religious toleration — Polygamy forbidden.]
[Right to public domain disclaimed — Taxation of
lands — Exemption.]
[Territorial debts assumed.]
[Free nonsectarian schools.]
The following ordinance shall be irrevocable without the
consent of the United States and the people of this State:
[Religious toleration — P o l y g a m y forbidden.]
First: — Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is guaranteed. No inhabitant of this State shall ever be molested in
person or property on account of his or her mode of religious
worship; but polygamous or plural marriages are forever
prohibited.
1896
[Right t o public d o m a i n d i s c l a i m e d — Taxation of lands
— Exemption.]
Second: — The people inhabiting this State do affirm and
declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the
unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries
hereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held
by any Indian or Indian tribes, and t h a t until the title thereto
shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same
shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United
States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute
jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States.
The lands belonging to citizens of the United States, residing
without this State shall never be taxed at a higher rate than
the lands belonging to residents of this State; but nothing in
this ordinance shall preclude this state from taxing, as other
lands are taxed, any lands owned or held by any Indian who
has severed his tribal relations, and has obtained from the
United States or from any person, by patent or other grant, a
title thereto, save and except such lands as have been or may
be granted to any Indian or Indians under any act of Congress,
containing a provision exempting the lands thus granted from
taxation, which last mentioned lands shall be exempt from
taxation so long, and to such extent, as is or may be provided
in the act of Congress granting the same.
1945
[Territorial debts assumed.]
Third: — All debts and liabilities of t h e Territory of Utah,
incurred by authority of the Legislative Assembly thereof, are
hereby assumed and shall be paid by this State.
1896
[Free nonsectarian schools.]
Fourth: — The Legislature shall make laws for the establishment and maintenance of a system of public schools, which
shall be open to all the children of the State and be free from
sectarian control.
1896
ARTICLE IV
ELECTIONS AND RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE
Section
1. [Equal political rights.]
2. [Qualifications to vote.]
3. [Voters — Immunity from arrest.]
4. [Voters — Immunity from militia duty.]
5. [Voters to be citizens of United States.]
6. [Mentally incompetent persons, convicted felons, and certain criminals ineligible to vote.]
7. [Property qualification forbidden.]
8. [Ballot to be secret.]

HUSBAND AND WIFE
CHAPTER 5
GRANDPARENTS
Section
30-#-l
30-^-2

Definitions
Visitation rights of grandparents

30-£-l. Definitions.
As used m this act
(1) "District court" means the district court within
whose jurisdiction the grandchildren reside
(2) "Grandchildren" means the child or children that a
grandparent is seeking visitation rights with under this
chapter
(3) "Grandparent" means a person whose child is the
parent of the grandchildren
1992

30-6-1

Section
30-6-4 4
30-6-4 5
30-6-4 6

No denial of relief solely because of lapse of time
Mutual protective orders prohibited
Prohibition of court-ordered or court-referred
mediation
30-6-4 8
Electronic monitoring of domestic violence offenders
30-6-5 to 30-6-7 Repealed
30-6-8
Statewide domestic violence network — Peace
officers' duties — Prevention of abuse m absence of order — Limitation of liability
30-6-9, 30-6-10 Repealed
30-6-H
Division of Child and Family Services — Development and assistance of volunteer network.
30-6-12
Full faith and credit fo** foreign protective orders
30-6-14
Authority to prosecute class A misdemeanor violations

30-15-2. Visitation rights of grandparents.
(J.) The district court may grant grandparents reasonable 30-0-1. D e f i n i t i o n s .
ngfrts of visitation, if it is m the best interest of the grandAs used in this chapter
children, in cases where a grandparent's child has died or has
(1) "Abuse" means attempting to cause, or intentionally
became a noncustodial parent through divorce or legal sepaor knowingly causing to an adult or minor physical harm
ration
or intentionally placing another in fear of imminent
($) In cases other than those described in Subsection (1), a
physical harm
grandparent may petition the court for reasonable rights of
(2) "Cohabitant" means an emancipated person pursuvisitation with a grandchild The court may enter an order
ant to Section 15-2-1 or a person who is 16 years of age or
granting the petitioner reasonable visitation rights in accorolder who
dance with the provisions and requirements of this Subsection
(a) is or was a spouse of the other party,
(2) There is a presumption that a parent's decision with
(b) is or was living as if a spouse of the other party,
regard to grandparent visitation is reasonable The court may
(c) is related \>y l)lood or marriage to the other
override the parent's decision and grant reasonable visitation
party,
rights to a grandparent if it finds that
(d) has one or more children in common with the
(a) it is in the best interest of the grandchild,
other party, or
(b) the petitioner is a fit and proper person to have
(e) resides or has resided in the same residence as
rights of visitation with the grandchild,
the other party
(c) the petitioner has repeatedly attempted to visit the
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), "cohabitant" does
grandchild and has not been allowed to visit the grandnot include
child as a direct result of the actions of the parent or
(a) the relationship of natural parent, adoptive
parents,
parent, or step-parent to a minor, or
(d) there is no other way for the petitioner to visit the
(b) the relationship between natural, adoptive,
grandchild without court intervention, and
step, or foster siblings who are under 18 years of age
(e) the petitioner has, by clear and convincing evidence,
rebutted the presumption that the parent's decision to
(4) "Court clerk" means a district court clerk or juvenile
refuse or limit visitation with the grandchild was reasoncourt clerk
able
(5) "Department" means the Department of Human
(3) Adoption of a child, voluntary or involuntary terminaServices
tion of parental rights, or relinquishment to a licensed child
(6) "Domestic violence" means the same as that term is
placing agency terminates all rights of a biological grandpardefined in Section 77-36-1
ent to petition for visitation under this section
(7) "Ex parte protective order" means an order issued
(4) Grandparents may petition the court as provided in
without notice to the defendant in accordance with this
Section 78-32-12 2 to remedy a parent's wrongful noncomplichapter
ance with a visitation order
1998
(8) "Foreign protective order" means a protective order
issued by another state, territory, or possession of the
United States, tribal lands of the United States, the
CHAPTER 6
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia
shall be given full faith and credit m Utah, if the protecCOHABITANT ABUSE A C T
tive order is similar to a protective order issued m
Section
compliance with Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse
30-6-1
Definitions
Act, or Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures
30-6-2
Abuse or danger of abuse — Protective orders
Act, and includes the following requirements
30-6-3
Venue of action
(a) the requirements of due process were met by
30-6-4
Forms for petitions and protective orders —
the issuing court, including subject matter and perAssistance
sonal jurisdiction,
30-6-4 1
Continuing duty to inform court of other proceed
(b) the respondent received reasonable notice, and
mgs — Effect of other proceedings
(c) the respondent had an opportunity for a hear
30-6-4 2
Protective orders — Ex parte protective orders —
mg regarding the protective order
Modification of orders — Service of process —
(9) "Law enforcement unit" or "law enforcement
Duties of the court
agency" means any public agency having general police
30-6-4 3
Hearings on ex parte orders
power and charged with making arrests m connection

30-6-2

HUSBAND AND WIFE

with enforcement of the criminal statutes and ordinances
of this state or any political subdivision
(10) T e a c e officer" means those persons specified m
Title 53, Chapter 13, Peace Officer Classifications
(11) "Protective order" means a restraining order issued pursuant to this chapter subsequent to a hearing on
the petition, of which the petitioner has given notice in
accordance with this chapter
1998
30-0-2. A b u s e or d a n g e r of abuse — P r o t e c t i v e orders.
(1) Any cohabitant or any child residing with a cohabitant
who has been subjected to abuse or domestic violence, or to
whom there is a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of
abuse or domestic violence, may seek an ex parte protective
order or a protective order in accordance with this chapter,
whether or not that person has left the residence or the
premises m an effort to avoid further abuse
(2) (a) A petition for a protective order may be filed under
this chapter regardless of whether an action for divorce
between the parties is pending
(b) If a complaint for divorce has already been filed in
district court, a petition under this chapter may be filed as
part of the divorce proceedings
{$} k cohabitant, t h e department, OT any person ox institution interested in a minor may seek a protective order on
behalf of the minor under the circumstances described in
Subsection (1), regardless of whether the minor could have
filed a petition on his own behalf If a cohabitant intends to
seek a protective order on his own behalf and on behalf of a
minor, a single petition may be filed
(4) The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to represent
the minor if the court considers the appointment necessary for
the welfare of the minor
(5) The county attorney or district attorney, if appropriate,
shall represent the department where the department appears as a petitioner
(6) A petition seeking a protective order may not be withdrawn without approval of the court
1996
30-6-3. Venue of action.
(1) The district court h a s jurisdiction of any action brought
under this chapter The juvenile court has concurrent jurisdiction of an action brought under this chapter if a protective
order is sought on behalf of a minor unless the petition is filed
by a natural parent, adoptive parent, or step-parent of the
mrfror against a natural parent, adoptive parent, or stepparent of the minor
(2) An action brought p u r s u a n t to this chapter shall be filed
m the county where either party resides or in which the action
complained of took place
1995
30*6-4.

F o r m s for p e t i t i o n s a n d protective orders —
Assistance.
(1) (a) The offices of the court clerk shall provide forms and
nonlegal assistance to persons seeking to proceed under
this chapter
(b) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall develop and adopt uniform forms for petitions and orders for
protection m accordance with the provisions of this chapter on or before September 1, 1995 That office shall
provide the forms to the clerk of each court authorized to
issue protective orders The forms shall include
(I) a statement notifying the petitioner for an ex
parte protective order that knowing falsification of
any statement or information provided for the purpose of obtaining a protective order may subject the
petitioner to felony prosecution,
(II) a separate portion of the form for those provisions, the violation of which is a criminal offense, and
a separate portion for those provisions, the violation
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of which is a civil violation, as provided m Subsection
30-6-4 2(5),
(111) language in the criminal provision portion
stating violation of any criminal provision is a class A
misdemeanor, and language m the civil portion stating violation of or failure to comply with a civil
provision is subject to contempt proceedings,
(IV) a space for information the petitioner is able to
provide to facilitate identification of the respondent,
such as social security number, driver license number, date of birth, address, telephone number, and
physical description,
(v) a space for the petitioner to request a specific
period of time for the civil provisions to be m effect,
not to exceed 150 days, unless the petitioner provides
in writing the reason for the requested extension of
the length of time beyond 150 days,
(vi) a statement advising the petitioner t h a t when
a minor child is included in an ex parte protective
order or a protective order, as part of either the
criminal or the civil portion of the order, the petitioner may provide a copy of the order to the principal
of the school where the child attends, and
(vn) a statement advising the petitioner t h a t if the
respondent fails to r e t u r n custody of a minor child to
the petitioner as ordered in a protective order, the
petitioner may obtain from the court a writ of assistance
(2) If the person seeking to proceed under this chapter is
not represented by an attorney, it is the responsibility of the
court clerk's office to provide
(a) the forms adopted p u r s u a n t to Subsection (1),
(b) all other forms required to petition for an order for
protection including, but not limited to, forms for service,
(c) clerical assistance m filling out the forms and filing
the petition, m accordance with Subsection (l)(a) A court
clerk's office may designate any other entity, agency, or
person to provide t h a t service, but the court clerk's office
is responsible to see t h a t the service is provided,
(d) information regarding the means available for the
service of process,
(e) a list of legal service organizations t h a t may represent the petitioner in an action brought under this chapter, together with the telephone numbers of those organizations, and
(f) written information regarding the procedure for
transporting a jailed or imprisoned respondent to the
protective order hearing, including an explanation of the
use of tr&r^yyjrt&tvm order forms, wher^ necessary
(3) No charges may be imposed by a court clerk, constable,
or law enforcement agency for
(a) filing a petition under this chapter,
(b) obtaining an ex parte protective order,
(c) obtaining copies, either certified or not certified,
necessary for service or delivery to law enforcement
officials, or
(d) fees for service of a petition, ex parte protective
order, or protective order
(4) A petition for an order of protection shall be in writing
and verified
(5) (a) All orders for protection shall be issued in the form
adopted by the Administrative Office of the Courts pursuant to Subsection (1)
(b) Each protective order issued, except orders issued
ex parte, shall include the following language
"Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity
to be heard in the hearing t h a t gave rise to this order
Pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, P L
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(c) class A misdemeanor if the act involves the operation or other use of a motor vehicle,
(d) t h u d degree felony if the act involves the use of a
dangerous weapon as defined m Section 76-1-601,
(e) third degree felony if the hazing results in serious
bodily injury to a person, or
(f) second degree felony if hazing under Subsection
(3)(e) involves the use of a dangerous weapon as defined m
Section 76-1-601
(4) A person who in good faith reports or participates in
reporting of an alleged hazing is not subject to any civil or
criminal liability regarding the reporting
(5) (a) This section does not apply to military training or
other official military activities
(b) Military conduct is governed by Title 39, Chapter 6,
Utah Code of Military Justice
(6) (a) A prosecution under this section does not bar a
prosecution of the actor for
d) any other offense for which the actor may be
liable as a party for conduct committed by the person
hazed, or
(n) any offense, caused m the course of the hazing,
that the actor commits against the person who is
hazed
(b) Under Subsection (6)(a)(i) a person may be separately punished both for the hazing offense and the
conduct committed by the person hazed
(c) Under Subsection (6)(a)(n) a person may not be
punished both for hazing and for the other offense, but
shall be punished for the offense carrying the greater
maximum penalty
1997
76-5-108.

P r o t e c t i v e orders r e s t r a i n i n g abuse of another — Violation.
(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject
to a protective order or ex parte protective order issued under
Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse Act, or Title 78, Chapter
3a, Juvenile Court Act of 1996, Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act, or a foreign protective order as
described m Section 30-6-12, who intentionally or knowingly
violates that order after having been properly served, is guilty
of a class A misdemeanor, except as a greater penalty may be
provided in Title 77 Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act
(2) Violation of an order as described m Subsection (1) is a
domestic violence offense under Section 77-36-1 and subject to
increased penalties in accordance with Section 77-36-1 1
1999

76-5-109. Child abuse.
(1) As used in this section
(a) "Child" means a h u m a n being who is 17 years of age
or less
(b) "Child abuse" means any offense described in Subsection (2) or (3), or in Section 76-5-109 1
(c) "Physical injury" means an injury to or condition of
a child which impairs the physical condition of the child,
including
d) a bruise or other contusion of the skin,
(n) a minor laceration or abrasion,
(m) failure to thrive or malnutrition, or
(IV) any other condition which imperils the child's
health oi welfare and which is not a serious physical
injury as defined in Subsection (l)(d)
(d) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury
or set of injuries which seriously impairs the child's
health, or which involves physical torture or causes serious emotional harm to the child, or which involves a
substantial risk of death to the child, including
d) fracture of any bone or bones,
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(n) intracranial bleeding, swelling or contusion of
the bram, whether caused by blows, shaking, or
causing the child s head to impact with an object or
surface,
(m) any burn, including burns inflicted by hot
water, or those caused by placing a hot object upon
the skm or body of the child,
(iv) any mjurv caused by use of a dangerous
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601,
(v) any combination of two or more physical injuries inflicted by the same person, either at the same
time or on different occasions,
(vi) any damage to internal organs of the body,
(vn) any conduct toward a child which results m
severe emotional harm, severe developmental delay
or retardation, or severe impairment of t h e child's
ability to function,
(vm) any injury which creates a permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of a bodily member, limb, or organ,
(IX) any conduct which causes a child to cease
breathing, even if resuscitation is successful following the conduct, or
(x) any conduct which results m starvation or
failure to thrive or malnutrition that jeopardizes the
child's life
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical
injury or, having the care or custody of such child, causes or
permits another to inflict serious physical injury upon a child
is guilty of an offense as follows
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a
felony of the second degree,
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third
degree, or
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a
class A misdemeanor
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or,
having the care or custody of such child, causes or permits
another to inflict physical injury upon a child is guilty of an
offense as follows
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a
class A misdemeanor,
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misdemeanor, or
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a
class C misdemeanor
(4) A parent or legal guardian who provides a child with
treatment by spiritual means alone through prayer, in lieu of
medical treatment, in accordance with the tenets and practices of an established church or religious denomination of
which the parent or legal guardian is a member or adherent
shall not, for that reason alone, be deemed to have committed
an offense under this section
1999
76-5-109.1. Commission of d o m e s t i c v i o l e n c e i n the
presence of a child.
(1) As used in this section
(a) "Domestic violence" means the same as t h a t term is
defined m Section 77 36-1
(b) "In the presence of a child" means
(I) m the physical presence of a child, or
(n) having knowledge t h a t a child is present and
may see or hear an act of domestic violence
(2) A person is guilty of child abuse if he
(a) commits or attempts to commit criminal homicide,
as defined in Section 76-5-201, against a cohabitant in the
presence of a child or
(b) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to a cohabitant or uses a dangerous weapon, as defined i**
Section 76-1-601
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
125 East Center Street, Moab

RACHEL TUCKER,
Petitioner,
vs.
GREG TUCKER,
Respondent.

*

PROTECTIVE ORDER

*
*
*
*

Case No. 9847-94
Judge Lyle R. Anderson

This matter came on for hearing on August 19,1998 at the hour of 3 30 p m in the
Seventh District Court, the Honorable Lyle R Anderson presiding Petitioner was present and
represented by her attorney, Rosalie Reilly The Respondent was present and represented by his
attorney, Bruce Oliver At that time, Respondent moved to have the instant Petition dismissed
on the basis that another Protective Order was in effect (Case No 9647-44) Petitioner moved to
amend, changing the Petition for Protective Order to a Petition for Modification The Court
granted the motion to amend and ordered the cases consolidated as case number 9847-94 Since
that time, the Court has learned that the Protective Order in case 9647-44 was dismissed on the
5th day of August, 1998 The Court, therefore, vacates it's order and reinstates the Petition for

protective Order under case number 9847-94.
Based on the testimony received, and having heard argument of the parties, the Court
orders as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
1. The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to commit
domestic violence or abuse against Petitioner.
2. The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to commit
domestic violence or abuse against the minor children, namely, Brittany Tucker, (date of birth:
1/6/92); Trevor Tucker, (date of birth: 8/18/93); Tyler Tucker, (date of birth: 8/18/93); and other
household members, Marcy Jarrett; Colt Jarrett and Theresa Adams.

®

The Respondent is prohibited from directly or indirectly contacting, harassing,

telephoning, or otherwise communicating with the Petitioner.
4. The Respondent is ordered to stay away from the Petitioner's school, place of
employment, and other places frequented by Petitioner, the minor children and designated
family or household members. Specifically, the following addresses:
3641 Roberts Road, Moab, Utah.
425 South Main Street, Moab, Utah.
300 E. 200 South #1, Moab, Utah.
5. The Respondent is prohibited from purchasing, using, or possessing a firearm or other
weapon.
6. The Petitioner is granted permission to retrieve her essential belongings, as well as the

children's essential belongings from the n -

:

'

7. Petitioner is granted temporary custody of the parties' minor children, namely
Brittany, Trevor, .mil 1 , In 1 m 1
8. The Respondent is allowed supervised visitation of the parties
through Ik1 Dcpaitmonl n\ rumilv .Services.
9. The Respondent is restrained from usmj* ukoho! «i,uf ilui,1', pnui 1. ,ti it I during the
supervised visitation with the parties' minor children.
10. The Respt*'-.* •* -

- support in the amount of $300.00 per month

pursuant to the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines.
I I I lie Ki (HHitkril is ordered to pay one-half of the minor children's day care expenses
actually incurred by Petitioner.
RESPONDENT'S VIOLATION OF PROVISIONS 1-8 OF THIS ORDER WILL
CONSTITUTE A CLASS A MISDEMF \ Ml HI 1.1 I 111-11< l \ u I V i\l \ V BE HELD IN
CONTEMPT FOR IGNORING OR ALTERING HE TERMS OF THIS ORDER.
DAFED this T^lsiA

u

^tflfisus)?;^
Ml

, 1998
B^THE, COURT:
^

R. ANDERSO
DISTRICT COI IRT JI JDGE
Serve Respondent at:
1171 Murphy Lane
Moab, Utah 84532
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Attorney for Defendant
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County, Utah
FILED
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-oooOooo)

STATE OF UTAH,
)
Plaintiff,

MOTION TO DISMISS

(

vs.
GREG TUCKER,

Case no. 9bi/-ib3

v

)

Defendant.

(

Judge Lyle R Anderson
)

Comes now the defendant, Greg Tucker, by and through counsel, D. Bruce
Oliver, .iiiinl lit t'i I \\\\)\c> litis Honorable < 'omtl lor a dismissal of this matter for the violation
of the Cohabitant Abuse Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-1 etseq. and Cohabitant Aii^i
Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-36-1 etseq. The Protective Order allegedly violated is
unenforceable by the State of b urn m

v, ,:

This motion is filed pursuant to the Declaration of Rights Clauses and Bill of
Rights expressed ;tn<l implied imdei A Hide I, Sections 1

•

of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and h

4 °5. 26, & 27
<

Amendments (n tin I A Constitution. Said motion is further supported by the accompanying
memorandum of points and authorities which n meorpoiiiied lieu H dini ,1111n \ed heieto by this

